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Fundamental primitives such as bit commitment and oblivious transfer serve as building blocks for
many other two-party protocols. Hence, the secure implementation of such primitives are important
in modern cryptography. In this work, we present a bit commitment protocol which is secure as
long as the attacker’s quantum memory device is imperfect. The latter assumption is known as
the noisy-storage model. We experimentally executed this protocol by performing measurements
on polarization-entangled photon pairs. Our work includes a full security analysis, accounting for
all experimental error rates and finite size effects. This demonstrates the feasibility of two-party
protocols in this model using real-world quantum devices. Finally, we provide a general analysis of
our bit commitment protocol for a range of experimental parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the main objective of cryptography has
been to protect communication from the prying eyes of an
eavesdropper. Yet, with the advent of modern commu-
nications new cryptographic challenges arose: we would
like to enable two parties, Alice and Bob, to solve joint
problems even if they do not trust each other. Exam-
ples of such tasks include secure auctions or the problem
of secure identification such as that of a customer to an
ATM. Whereas protocols for general two-party crypto-
graphic problems may be very involved, it is known that
they can in principle be built from basic cryptographic
building blocks known as oblivious transfer [1] and bit
commitment.
The task of bit commitment is thereby particularly
simple and has received considerable attention in quan-
tum information. Intuitively, a bit commitment protocol
consists of two phases. In the commit phase, Alice pro-
vides Bob with some form of evidence that she has chosen
a particular bit C ∈ {0, 1}. Later on in the open phase,
Alice reveals C to Bob. A bit commitment protocol is
secure, if Bob cannot gain any information about C be-
fore the open phase, and yet, Alice cannot convince Bob
to accept an opening of any bit Cˆ 6= C.
Unfortunately, it has been shown that even using quan-
tum communication none of these tasks can be imple-
mented securely [2–6]. Note that in quantum key distri-
bution (QKD), Alice and Bob trust each other and want
to defend themselves against an outsider Eve. This allows
Alice and Bob to perform checks on what Eve may have
done, ruling out many forms of attacks. This is in sharp
contrast to two-party cryptography where there is no Eve
and Alice and Bob do not trust each other. Intuitively, it
is this lack of trust that makes the problem considerably
harder. Nevertheless, because two-party protocols form
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a central part of modern cryptography, one is willing to
make assumptions on how powerful an attacker can be
in order to implement them securely.
Here, we consider physical assumptions that enable us
to solve such tasks. In particular, can the sole assumption
of a limited storage device lead to security? [7] This is
indeed the case and it was shown that security can be
obtained if the attacker’s classical storage is limited [7, 8].
Yet, apart from the fact that classical storage is cheap
and plentiful, assuming a limited classical storage has
one rather crucial caveat: If the honest players need to
store N classical bits to execute the protocol in the first
place, any classical protocol can be broken if the attacker
can store more than roughly N2 bits [9].
Motivated by this unsatisfactory gap, it was thus sug-
gested to assume that the attacker’s quantum storage
was bounded [10–14], or more generally, noisy [15–17].
The central assumption of the noisy-storage model is that
during waiting times ∆t introduced in the protocol, the
attacker can only keep quantum information in his quan-
tum storage device F . The exact amount of noise can
depend on the waiting time. Otherwise, the attacker may
be all-powerful. In particular, he can store an unlimited
amount of classical information, and perform any com-
putation instantaneously without errors. Note that the
latter implies that the attacker could encode his quantum
information into an arbitrarily complicated error correct-
ing code, to protect it from noise in his storage device F .
The assumption that storing a large amount of quan-
tum information is difficult is indeed realistic today, as
constructing large scale quantum memories that can store
arbitrary information successfully in the first attempt has
proved rather challenging. We emphasize that this model
is not in contrast with our ability to build quantum re-
peaters, where it is sufficient for the latter to store quan-
tum states while making many attempts. A review on
quantum memories can be found in [18], and numerous
recent work can also be found in [19–21]. While noting
that perpetual advances in building quantum memories
fundamentally affect the feasibility of all protocols in the
noisy storage model, yet we will explain below that given
2any upper bound on the size and noisiness of a future
quantum storage device, security is in fact possible - we
merely need to send more qubits during the protocol.
In this work, we have implemented a bit commitment
protocol that is secure under the noisy storage assump-
tion. We provide a general security analysis of our pro-
tocol for a range of possible experimental parameters.
The parameters of our particular experiment are shown
to lie within the secure region. The storage assumption
in our work is such that a cheating party cannot store
more than approximately 900 qubits, which is a reason-
able physical constraint given modern day technology of
storing quantum information.
II. RESULT
The Noisy Storage Model
To state our result, let us first explain what we mean by
a quantum storage device, and how does an assumption
regarding these devices translate to security conditions in
the noisy storage model. A more detailed introduction
to the model can be found in e.g. [17].
Of particular interest to us are storage devices consist-
ing of S ”memory cells”, each of which may experience
some noise N itself. Mathematically, this means that the
storage device is a quantum channel [mathematically, a
completely positive trace preserving map (CPTPM)] of
the form F = N⊗S where N : B(Cd)→ B(Cd) is a noisy
channel acting on each memory cell mapping input states
to some noisy output states. For example, a noise-free
storage device consisting of S qubits (i.e.,d = 2) corre-
sponding to the special case of bounded storage [12] is
given by F = I⊗S2 where I2 is the identity channel with
one qubit input and one qubit output. Another exam-
ple is a memory consisting of S qubits, each of which
experiences depolarizing noise according to the channel
Nr(ρ) = rρ + (1 − r) I2 . The larger r is, the less noise
is present. Yet another example is the erasure channel,
which models losses in the storage device.
It is indeed intuitive that security should be related
to ”how much” information the attacker can squeeze
through his storage device. That is, one expects a re-
lation between security and the capacity of F to carry
quantum information. Indeed, it was shown that security
can be linked to the classical capacity [17], the entangle-
ment cost [22], and finally the quantum capacity [23] of
the adversary’s storage device F .
When evaluating security, we start with a basic as-
sumption on the maximum size and the minimum
amount of noise in an adversary’s storage device. Such an
assumption can for example be derived by a cautious es-
timate based on quantum memories that are available to-
day. Note that these assumptions are for memories that
can store arbitrary states on first attempt. Such memo-
ries presently exist for a handful of qubits. Given such
an estimate, we then determine the number of qubits we
need to transmit during the protocol to effectively over-
flow the adversary’s memory device and achieve security.
Protocol and its security
We consider the bit commitment protocol from [17]
with several modifications to make it suitable for an ex-
perimental implementation with time-correlated photon
pairs. Figure 1 provides a simplified version of this mod-
ified protocol without explicit parameters - the explicit
version can be found in the Supplementary Methods. In
the Supplementary Methods, we also provide a general
analysis that can be used for any experimental setup (de-
tails on our particular experiment are also provided in the
same section).
To understand the security constraints, we first need
to establish some basic terminology. In our experiment,
Alice holds the source, and both Alice and Bob have four
detectors, each one corresponding to one of the four BB84
states [10]. If Alice or Bob observes a click of exactly
one of their detectors (symmetrized with the procedure
outlined in Supplementary Methods), we refer to it as a
valid click. Cases where more than one detector clicks at
the same instant on the same side are ignored. A round
is defined by a valid click of Alice’s detectors. A valid
round is where both parties Alice and Bob registered a
valid click in a corresponding time window, i.e., where a
photon pair has been identified.
First, to deal with losses in the channel we introduce a
new step in which Bob reports a loss if he did not observe
a valid click. Second, to deal with bit flip errors on the
channel, we employ a different class of error-correcting
codes, namely a random code. Usage of random codes is
sufficient for this protocol since decoding is not required
for honest parties. The main challenge is then to link the
properties of random codes to the protocol security.
Before we can argue about the correctness and secu-
rity of the proposed protocol, let us introduce four crucial
figures of interest that need to be determined in any ex-
perimental setup. The first two are the probabilities p0sent
and p1sent, that none or just a single photon was sent to
Bob respectively, conditioned on the event that Alice ob-
served a round. The third is the probability phB,noclick
that honest Bob registers a round as missing, i.e. Bob
does not observe a valid click when Alice does. Again,
this probability is conditioned on the event that Alice
observed a round. Note that by no-signalling, Alice’s
choice of better (or worse) detectors should not influence
the probability of Bob observing a round. Finally, we
will need the probability perr of a bit flip error, i.e. the
probability that Bob outputs the wrong bit even though
he measured in the correct basis.
Naturally, since Alice and Bob do not trust each other,
they cannot rely on each other to perform said estima-
tion process. Note, however, that the scenario of inter-
est in two-party cryptography is that the honest parties
essentially purchase off the shelf devices with standard
3properties, for which either of them could perform said
estimate. It is only the dishonest parties who may be us-
ing alternate equipment. Another way to look at this is
to say that there exists some set of parameters (i.e., max-
imum losses, maxmium amount of noise on the channel,
etc) such that an honest party has to conform to these
requirements when executing the protocol.
Let us now sketch why the proposed protocol remains
correct and secure even in the presence of experimental
errors. A detailed analysis is provided in the Supplemen-
tary Methods. In our analysis, we take the storage de-
vice F , as well as a fixed overall security error ǫ as given.
Let M be the number of rounds Alice registers during
the execution of the protocol. Let n be the number of
valid rounds. In the description of theoretical parameters
found in the Supplementary Methods, it is shown thatM
and n are directly related to each other, given some fixed
experimental parameters. In particular, n is a function
of M and phB,noclick
n ≈ (1− phB,noclick)M . (1)
We can now ask, how large does M (or equivalently n)
need to be in order to achieve security. If n is very small,
for example if n ≈ 100, it is relatively easy to break the
protocol since a cheating party might be able to store
enough qubits. Also many terms from our finite n anal-
ysis reach convergence only for sufficiently large n. As
these terms depend on experimental parameters, secu-
rity can be achieved for a larger range of experimental
parameters if n is large. By fixing the assumption on
quantum storage size, experiment parameters and secu-
rity error values, our analysis allows us to determine a
value of n where security is achievable.
Correctness: First of all, we must show that if Alice
and Bob are both honest, then Bob will accept Alice’s
honest opening of the bit C. Note that the only way
that honest Bob will reject Alice’s opening is when too
many errors occur on the channel, and hence part 2 of
Bob’s final check (see Figure 1) will fail. A standard
Chernoff style bound using the Hoeffding inequality [24]
shows the probability of this event is small, i.e., that the
deviation from the expected number of perrn errors is not
too large.
Security against Alice: Second, we must show that
if Bob is honest, then Alice cannot get him to accept
an opening of a bit Cˆ 6= C. In our protocol, Alice is
allowed to be all powerful, and is not restricted by any
storage assumptions. If she is dishonest, we furthermore
assume that she can even have perfect devices and can
eliminate all errors and losses on the channel. The first
part of our analysis, i.e., the analysis of the steps before
the syndrome is sent is thereby identical to [25] (see Fig-
ure 1). More precisely, it is shown that up to this step
in the protocol, a string Xn ∈ {0, 1}n is generated such
that Bob knows the bits XI for a randomly chosen sub-
set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, where XI corresponds to the entries
of the string Xn indexed by the positions in I. If Alice
is dishonest, we want to be sure at this stage that she
Accept commitment. Reject commitment.
Are the checks satisfied?
Alice Bob
Both parties wait for time Δt.
- Send basis information to Bob. - Compare Alice's basis against his.
- Compute:
- From the bit values recorded, Alice obtains a
  binary string Χn of length  .
- Observe one side of an entangled photon pair 
  source by measuring polarization of photons 
  in a randomly chosen basis and for each 
  photon records the basis θi and bit value Χi. 
- Send timing  tA of valid clicks to Bob.
- Store w,  r  and   E. 
A.  Commit Phase
B.  Open Phase
- Send Χn to Bob.  
- Send committed bit C to Bob.
Alice and Bob agree on an eror correcting code specified by the parity check matrix H. 
Yes No
- Check if rounds reported missing by Bob are 
  within acceptable range. If so, continue.
- Inform Alice about missing rounds.
- Observe the other side of the photon 
  pair source by measuring photons in 
  a randomly chosen basis θi and 
  records result Χi. 
- Identify valid rounds by finding 
  matching valid clicks for timings tA.
~
~
1. set                I = { i    [n] | θi = θi }            
~
- Compute:
   1. syndrome using Χn and H.  
   2. committed bit A = Ext(Χn, r)     E.  
- Check that:
1. Syn(Χn) = w and A = C. 
- Compute syndrome w.
- Choose a 2-universal hash function r. 
- Send w and r to Bob.  
- Compute D = Ext(Χn, r) and send .
  E =   C   D  to Bob.  
2. substring    ΧI = { Χi | i    I }
~~
2. Χn and ΧI agree except for 
    expected number of errors.
~
FIG. 1: Flowchart of the bit commitment protocol. This
protocol allows Alice to commit a single bit C ∈ {0, 1}. Al-
ice holds the source that creates the entangled photon pairs.
The function Syn maps the binary string Xn to its syn-
drome as specified by the error correcting code. The function
Ext : {0, 1}n ⊗ R → {0, 1} is a hash function indexed by r,
performing privacy amplification. We refer to the Supplemen-
tary Methods for a more detailed statement of the protocol
including details on the acceptable range of losses and errors.
Note that the protocol itself does not require any quantum
storage to execute.
cannot learn I, that is, she cannot learn which bits of
Xn are known to Bob. In the original protocol without
experimental imperfections [17] this was trivially guar-
anteed because Bob never sent any information to Alice.
In this practical protocol, however, Bob does send some
information to Bob, namely which rounds are valid for
him, i.e., when he saw a click. In [25] it was simply as-
sumed that the probability of Bob observing a loss is the
same for all detectors, and hence in particular also in-
dependent of Bob’s basis choice. This is generally never
the case in practise. However, by symmetrizing the losses
as outlined in the Supplementary Methods, one can en-
sure that the losses become the same for all detectors. In
essence, this procedure probabilistically adds additional
losses to the better detectors such that in the end all
detectors are as lossy as the worst one. As Bob’s losses
are then independent of his basis choice, i.e., the detec-
4tor, this is means that Alice cannot gain any information
about I when Bob reports some rounds as being lost.
The second part of the protocol and its analysis uses
the string Xn and Bob’s partial knowledge XI to bind
Alice to her commitment. First, we have that properties
of the error-correcting code ensure that if the syndrome
of the string (Syn(Xn) in Figure 1) matches and Alice
passes the first test, then she must flip many bits in the
string to change her mind. In the original protocol of [17]
sending Bob the syndrome of Xn ensured that she must
change at least d2 bits of X
n where d is the distance of
the error-correcting code, such that Bob will accept the
syndrome to be consistent. However, since Alice does not
know which bits XI are known to Bob she will get caught
with high probability. This due to the fact that with
probability 1−(1/2)d/2 Alice changed at least a bit known
to Bob, and in the perfect case Bob aborts whenever a
single bit is wrong. As we have to deal with experimental
imperfections we cannot have that Bob aborts whenever
a single bit is wrong, as bit flip errors on the channel
likely lead errors even when Alice is honest. As such the
difference to the analysis of [17] is that Bob must accept
some incorrect bits in part two of his final check (see Fig-
ure 1). Our argument is nevertheless quite similar, but
does require a careful tradeoff involving all experimen-
tal parameters between the distance of the code and the
syndrome length (see below). We hence use a different
error-correcting code as compared to [17]. In particu-
lar, we use a random code which has the property that
with overwhelming probability its distance is large (i.e.
it is hard for Alice to cheat), while nevertheless having
a reasonably small syndrome length (see Supplementary
Discussion). The latter will be important in the security
analysis below when Alice herself is honest.
Security against Bob: Finally, we must show that
if Alice is honest, then Bob cannot learn any information
about her bit C before the open phase. Again, dishonest
Bob may have perfect devices and eliminate all errors and
losses on the channel. His only restriction is that during
the waiting time ∆t he can store quantum information
only in the device F .
We first show that Bob’s information about the en-
tire string Xn is limited. We know from [17] that Bob’s
min-entropy about the string Xn before Alice sends the
syndrome, given all his information including his quan-
tum memory can be bounded by
Hmin(X
n|Bob) & − logPFsucc(Rn) , (2)
where PFsucc(Rn) is the maximum probability of trans-
mitting Rn randomly chosen bits through the chan-
nel F where R is called the rate. This rate is de-
termined using a novel uncertainty relation that we
prove for BB84 measurements, and all experimental pa-
rameters. The min-entropy itself can thereby be ex-
pressed as Hmin(X
n|Bob) = − logPguess(Xn|Bob), where
Pguess(X
n|Bob) is the probability that Bob guesses the
string Xn, maximized over all measurements that he can
perform on his system [26].
As Alice sends the syndrome to Bob, Bob gains some
additional information which reduces his min-entropy.
More precisely, it could shrink at most by the length of
the syndrome, i.e.,
Hmin(X
n|Bob, Syn(Xn)) ≥ Hmin(Xn|Bob)− log |Syn(Xn)| .
(3)
Note that this is the reason why we asked for the error-
correcting code to have a short syndrome length above.
Finally, we show that knowing little about all of Xn
implies that Bob cannot learn anything about C itself.
More precisely, when Alice chooses a random two uni-
versal hash function Ext(·, R) and performs privacy am-
plification [27], Bob knows essentially nothing about the
output Ext(Xn, R) = D whenever his min-entropy about
Xn is sufficiently large. The bit D then acts as a key to
encrypt the bit C using a one-time pad. Since Bob can-
not know D, he also cannot know C. Our analysis is
thereby very similar to [17], requiring only a very careful
balance between the distance of the error-correcting code
above, and the syndrome length.
We provide a detailed analysis in the Supplementary
Methods, where a general statement for arbitrary storage
devices is included. Especially for the case of bounded
storage F = I⊗S2 , we can easily evaluate how large M
needs to be in order to achieve security against both Alice
and Bob, when an error parameter ǫ is fixed. The total
execution error of the protocol is obtained by adding up
all sources of errors throughout the protocol analysis.
The case where Alice and Bob are both dishonest is not
of interest, because the aim of this protocol is to perform
correctly while both players are honest, and protect the
honest players from dishonest players.
Experiment
We have implemented a quantum protocol for bit com-
mitment that is secure in the noisy-storage model. For
this, n = 250 000 valid rounds (see below) were used
at a bit error rate of perr = 4.1% (after symmetriza-
tion) to commit one bit with a security error of less than
ǫ = 2 × 10−5. Note that ǫ is the final correctness and
security error for the execution of bit commitment in
our experiment. This protocol is secure under the as-
sumption that Bob’s storage size is no larger than 972
qubits, where each qubit undergoes a low depolarizing
noise with a noise parameter r = 0.9 (see Supplemen-
tary Methods Section D). We stress that our analysis
is done for finite n, and all finite size effects and errors
are accounted for. The ǫ includes the error in the choice
of random code in the protocol, finite size effects that
need to be bounded, smoothing parameters from an un-
certainty relation, etc. Our experimental implementation
demonstrates for the first time that two-party protocols
proposed in the bounded and noisy-storage models are
well within today’s capabilities.
5III. DISCUSSION
We demonstrated, for the first time, that two-party
protocols proposed in the bounded and noisy-storage
models can be implemented today. We emphasize that
whereas - like so many experiments in quantum infor-
mation - our experiment is extremely similar to QKD
the experimental parameter requirements and analysis is
entirely different to QKD. Where there are many exper-
iments carrying out QKD, there are only a handful of
implementation results for two party protocols [33, 34].
Bit commitment is one of the most fundamental proto-
cols in cryptography. For example, it is known that with
bit commitment, coin tossing can be built. Also using ad-
ditional quantum communication we can build oblivious
transfer [35], which in turn enables us to solve any two-
party cryptographic problem [1]. In the Supplementary
Methods, we provided a detailed analysis of our modified
bit commitment protocol including a range of parameters
for which security can be shown. Our analysis could be
used to implement the same protocol using a different,
technologically simpler setup, with potentially lower er-
ror rates or losses. Our analysis can also address the case
of committing several bits at once.
It would be interesting to see implementations of other
protocols in the noisy-storage model.
Finally, note that our analysis rests on a fundamen-
tal assumption made in in the analysis of all crypto-
graphic protocols, namely that Alice does not have access
to Bob’s lab and vice versa. In particular, this means that
Alice cannot tamper with the random choices made by
Bob, potentially forcing him to measure e.g. only in one
basis, or by maniplating apparent detector losses [36, 37].
IV. METHODS
Parameter ranges
Our theoretical analysis shows security for a general
range of parameters as illustrated in Figures 2, 3 and 4.
A fully general theoretical statement can be found in the
Supplementary Methods. These plots demonstrate that
security is possible for a wide range of parameters, of
which our particular implementation forms a special case.
The plots are done for fixed values of n = 250000 and a
total execution error of ǫ = 3 · 10−4, unless otherwise
indicated. Finally, Bob’s storage size is quantified by
S, the number of qubits that Bob is able to store. The
plots assume a memory of S qubits, where each qubit
undergoes depolarizing noise with parameter r = 0.9.
FIG. 2: Security region for p1sent versus p
h
B,noclick. Plots
were done for distinct values of perr, while storage size is fixed
S = 2500, and pdB,noclick = 0. For small values of p
h
B,noclick
(large amounts of losses), there exists a threshold on p1sent
for the protocol to be secure. This threshold increases with
perr, and for extremely small storage rates, it gives a maximal
tolerable perr ≈ 0.046.
FIG. 3: Security region for some typical parameter
ranges. phB,noclick and perr quantify the amount of erasures
and errors in the protocol. For higher summation values of
pdB,noclick+p
1
sent, the less multi-photons Bob gets, and erasures
have less impact on the protocol security. This implies if the
source is ideal, the protocol remains secure for large values of
erasures. Dependences in the security region between erasures
and errors also become more obvious when pdB,noclick+p
1
sent is
low. Furthermore, large assumptions on S directly decrease
the amount of min-entropy, causing tolerable perr to drop con-
sistently for all amounts of erasures.
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FIG. 4: Security region for different storage size S and
error rate perr, with p
1
sent = 0.765, and p
d
B,noclick = 0.234
fixed. This plot shows a monotonic decreasing trend for tol-
erable perr w.r.t storage size S. The sharp cut-off for S varies
with phB,noclick, since with lower detection efficiency, dishonest
Bob can report more missing rounds, hence the lower his stor-
age size has to be for security to hold. Also, the plot shows
security for mostly low values of storage rate. The result is
non-optimal, since it has been shown [22] that security can
be achieved with arbitrarily large storage sizes, if the depo-
larizing noise parameter r . 0.7. This is because we bound
the smooth min-entropy of an adversarial Bob by the classical
capacity of a quantum memory, while [22] does so in terms of
entanglement cost. Since the latter is generally smaller than
the former, this poses a better advantage for security which
is not shown in our analysis.
Experimental Implementation
We implement this protocol with a series of entangled
photons, with the polarization degree of freedom forming
our qubits. This allows for reliable measurements in two
complementary bases. Basis 1 corresponds to horizon-
tal/vertical (HV) polarization, and basis 2 to ±45◦ (+-)
linear polarization. The polarization-entangled photon
pairs are prepared via spontaneous parametric down con-
version (SPDC), collected into single mode optical fibers,
and guided to polarization analyzer (PA) located with
Alice and Bob (see figure 5). Each PA consists of a non-
polarizing beam splitter (BS) providing a random basis
choice, followed by two polarizing beam splitters (PBS)
and a pair of silicon avalanche photodiodes (APD) as sin-
gle photon detectors in each of the BS outputs. A half
wave plate before one of the PBS rotates the polariza-
tion by 45◦ degrees. This detection setup was used in a
number of QKD demonstrations [28–30].
The SPDC source is similar to [30], with a continuous
wave free running laser diode (398nm, 10mW) pumping
a 2mm thick Barium-betaborate crystal cut for type-II
non-collinear parametric down conversion and the usual
/2λ
/2λ
PA
Alice
PBS H
+
−
TU
V
PBS BS /2λ
PA
Bob
PBS
PBSBS
H
V
+
−
TU
CC
BBO
LD
SFSFFPC
FIG. 5: Experimental setup. Polarization-entangled pho-
ton pairs are generated via non-collinear type-II spontaneous
parametric down conversion of blue light from a laser diode
(LD) in a barium-betaborate crystal (BBO), and distributed
to polarization analyzers (PA) at Alice and Bob via single
mode optical fibers (SF). The PA are based on a nonpolariz-
ing beam splitter (BS) for a random measurement base choice,
a half wave plate (λ/2) at one of the of the outputs, and polar-
izing beam splitters (PBS) in front of single-photon counting
silicon avalanche photodiodes. Detection events on both sides
are timestamped (TU) and recorded for further processing. A
polarization controller (FPC) ensures that polarization anti-
correlations are observed in all measurement bases.
walk-off compensation to obtain polarization-entangled
photon pairs [31]. We collect photon pairs into single
mode optical fibers such that we observe an average pair
rate rp = 2997± 82 s−1.
Such a source generates photon pairs in a stochastic
manner, but with a strong correlation in time. There-
fore, valid clicks are timestamped on both sides first. In
a classical communication step, detection times tA, tB are
compared, and valid rounds are identified if valid clicks
fall into a coincidence time window of τc = 3ns, i.e.,
|tA − tB| ≤ τc/2, similar to [29] with the code in [32].
The visibility of the polarization correlations in the Sin-
glet state are 97.7± 0.6% and 94.7± 0.9% in the HV and
45◦ linear basis. Individual detection rates on both sides
are rA = 23758 ± 221 s−1 and rB = 22227 ± 247 s−1 on
Alice and Bob’s side, respectively. In an initial alignment
step, the fiber polarization controller was adjusted such
that we see polarization correlations corresponding to a
singlet state with a quantum bit error ratio (QBER) of
about perr = 4.1%. The QBER is not to be confused with
the failure probability of bit commitment protocol. Cal-
culations of the latter are explicitly stated in the Supple-
mentary Methods. As reported in the summarizing para-
graph of our introduction, this quantity is much smaller
than the former.
For carrying out a successful bit commitment, we need
to determine the parameters p1sent, p
0
sent, and p
h
B,noclick.
Depending on these probabilities and the desired error
parameter ǫ, we choose a particular error correcting code
and number of rounds M needed for a successful bit
commitment. To estimate these probabilities out of the
7experimental parameters of our source/detector combi-
nation, we model our setup by a lossless SPDC source
emitting only photon pairs at a rate rs, and assign all im-
perfections (losses, limited detection efficiency, and back-
ground events) to the detectors at Alice and Bob. Since
the coherence time of the photons in our case is much
shorter than the coincidence detection time window τc,
the distribution of photon pairs in time can be well de-
scribed by a Poisson process, which allows an assessment
of multiphoton events. A detailed derivation of bounds
for the probabilities is given in the Supplementary Meth-
ods, we just summarize the results necessary for evaluat-
ing the security of the protocol:
p0sent ≤ (rA − rp)/rA = 0.875± 0.009 , (4)
pn>1sent <
rArB
rp
τc = 5.32± 0.17× 10−4 , (5)
p1sent = 1− p0sent − pn>1sent > 0.125± 0.009 , (6)
p0sent + p
1
sent = 1− pn>1sent > 0.99947± 0.000017 , (7)
phB,noclick = 1− rp/rA = 0.875± 0.009 . (8)
Due to small differences in the detection efficiency of
the APD and imperfections in polarization components
in the actual experiment, there is an asymmetry in the
probability of detecting each bit in each basis. Further-
more, the beam splitter for the random measurement
basis choice are not completely balanced. A summary
of these imperfections over a number of bit commitment
runs is shown in figure 6. This can be corrected for by
discarding rounds until the probabilities for both bits are
equal. Discarded bits can be modeled as losses without
affecting the security of the protocol. A detailed analysis
of this can be found in the Supplementary Methods.
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FIG. 6: Bias in measurements. Solid lines indicate the prob-
abilities P (HV ) of a HV basis choice for both Alice and Bob
for data sets of 250000 events each. Dashed lines indicate
the probability P (H) of a H in the HV measurement basis,
the dotted lines the probability P (+) of a +45◦ detection in
a ±45◦ measurement basis. These asymmetries arise form
optical component imperfections and are corrected in a sym-
metrization step.
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Supplementary Figure S1: Model of experimental
setup. An ideal source generates time-correlated photon
pairs with a rate rs and sends them to detectors at Alice and
Bob. The losses (due to all causes including source imperfec-
tions and detection efficiencies) are modeled with attenuators
with a transmission ηA and ηB, respectively. To cater for
dark counts in detectors, fluorescence background and exter-
nal disturbances, we introduce background rates rbA, rbB on
both sides. Valid rounds are identified by a coincidence de-
tection mechanism that recognizes photons corresponding to
a given entangled pair. Event rates rA and rB reflect measur-
able detection rates at Alice and Bob, while rp indicates the
rate of identified coincidences.
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Supplementary Figure S2: The encoding and decod-
ing of a message. A total of k bits were encoded into n
bits and sent through the noisy channel, then recovered com-
pletely after undergoing the transmission process.
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Supplementary Figure S3: Relative distance of ran-
dom code versus code rate. A randomly generated code
reaches the bound given in Theorem 1 with overwhelming
probability. Meanwhile, the MRRW2 bound [38] is the small-
est upper bound derived up to the present, and it is not known
if this bound is tight. It is also not known if there exists any
linear binary codes at all between the two regions.
II. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES
Probabilities Description
p
1
sent Probability that a single photon was sent to Bob.
p
h
B,noclick
Probability that honest Bob observes no click.
p
d
B,noclick
Probability that dishonest Bob observes no click.
Note: this value is equal to p0sent, i.e., the
probability that no photons were sent to Bob.
perr Probability that the measurement outcome for
honest Alice and honest Bob is different,
when the same basis is used for both parties.
Supplementary Table S1: Parameters required for se-
curity proof of bit commitment. All the above quantities
are conditioned on the event that Alice registered a valid click.
9III. SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSION
Properties of Error-correcting codes
A linear error-correcting code can be defined by
specifying its parity check matrix H, which has di-
mensions n × (1 − R)n. Given a vector x of length
n, the parity check syndrome is simply Syn(x)=x·H. [38]
Recall that in our BC protocol, both parties agree
on a code beforehand, and during the commit phase,
Alice sends the syndrome to Bob. The syndrome mainly
serves as a back-checking procedure for Bob during the
open phase to confirm that Alice is honest. The longer
the length of the syndrome, the more information about
Xn is given to Bob, and the harder it becomes for Alice
to cheat. Both Alice and Bob agree on the code used,
and for our purposes the complications in decoding is
unnecessary, as an honest Bob never needs to decode.
In the theory of error-correcting codes, a question
of much significance is depicted in Supplementary
Figures S2 : given a scenario where information is
sent through an unavoidable noisy channel, under what
conditions does an encoding scheme exist such that the
message can be recovered completely after undergoing
the communication process? In other words, given a
message Y comprising of k bits and a noisy channel for
communication, what is the theoretical minimum length
of encoded message n, such that the decoding can detect
errors and recover Y accurately?
It has been shown by Shannon that for the recovery
of information to be possible, the fraction kn has a the-
oretical upper bound C, known as the capacity of the
channel. For any value R = kn > C, decoding is never
possible. For a binary symmetric channel, the capacity
is proven to be
CBSC(perr) = 1− h(perr), (S9)
where
h(perr) = −perr log2 perr − (1− perr) log2(1− perr) (S10)
is the binary entropy of the BSC channel.
For values of code rate R strictly above the chan-
nel capacity, the success probability of delivering the
message is exponentially decreasing with code length
regardless of the encoding/decoding scheme used.
Besides the code rate, another important quantity of
error-correcting codes is the minimum distance d. Given
an error-correcting code, this quantity shows the mini-
mum hamming distance between two strings that have
the same parity check syndrome. The larger the mini-
mum distance, the more effective a code is at correcting
errors. In the subsequent section, we investigate the rela-
tion of parametersR and d for randomly generated codes,
and show that random codes satisfy our requirements on
these parameters for the protocol to be secure.
Random Codes
Given a parity check matrix constructed randomly, we
are interested in what is the minimum distance of this
code. This problem is a computationally NP-hard one,
but we do know some probabilistic facts about the mini-
mum distance, which is stated in the theorem below:
Theorem 1. (Random codes, [39]) Given a randomly
generated binary linear code with rate R, the probabil-
ity that minimum distance d is smaller than some δn is
bounded by the following:
Pr[d ≤ δn] ≤ 2(R−Cδ)n, for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. (S11)
For large block lengths, we can see that this bound
approaches a step function where for rates R < Cδ, min-
imum distance is expected to be larger than δn except
with extremely small probability. For our choices of
block lengths, the randomly generated code will satisfy
the bound on minimum distance whenever R < Cδ,
except for some minimal probability that is later added
into the ǫ-error of the protocol. We plot this bound
in Supplementary Figures S3 with respect to the pa-
rameter δ = dn , which we refer to as the relative distance.
Given values of perr and reasonably small error
parameter ǫ, by referring to the conditions for minimum
distance derived in the security analysis, we obtain the
upper bound on the achievable rate, namely Cδ. This
guarantees that for small enough error rates perr, it is
sufficient to use a randomly generated code for the use of
our protocol, which will provide us both a good enough
distance and code rate, except with an extremely small
probability. By using Theorem 1 we account for the
probability of error and add it as a source of error for
the execution of the protocol.
LDPC codes
Random binary codes are generated by assigning
values 0 and 1 randomly to each element of the parity
check matrix. They have a high density (large fraction
of non-zero elements), which in large block length limit
is time-consuming to deal with. For efficiency purposes,
it is of interest whether we can construct codes with
lower density (less non-zero values).
In [39], Gallager has shown that a specific ensemble
of low density codes do attain the same limit given
for the random codes as above, when considering large
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enough block lengths. These codes involve using random
permutations of a submatrix, and the construction is
straightforward. This type of codes can be of future in-
terest, because their usage will shorten the calculational
time used in the protocol. However, this is achieved at
the expense of introducing an additional error probability
of constructing a bad code (one with unsatisfactory min-
imum distance), which is not straightforward to evaluate.
Concatenated codes
In the case of low bit-flip error, classes of explicit
concatenated codes might be generated such that the
minimum distance is guaranteed without introducing
any probabilistic errors from a randomized construction.
These codes are constructed by using a Reed-Solomon
code as an outer code, while using a smaller binary lin-
ear code as an inner code. We state the properties of
such concatenated codes in the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Concatenated codes). Given a
[n1, R1n1, d1] outer code, and a linear binary code
with parameters [n2, R2n2, d2]. Then the resulting
concatenated code has parameters [n1n2, k1k2, d], where
the code rate R = R1R2 and d ≥ d1d2.
For example, by exploiting this construction, a linear
binary concatenated code with rate R=0.53 and relative
minimum distance δ ≥ 0.052 can be constructed, where
the code length n = 311296. This value of δ has a large
discrepancy compared to the probabilistic argument for a
random code. From here it is clearly shown that, if a def-
inite statement regarding the minimum distance of such
large error-correcting codes (without any probabilistic er-
rors) is desired, one can still obtain security for smaller
ranges of experimental parameters. For the given exam-
ple of concatenated RS code, this corresponds to security
for bit flip error rates perr ≤ 0.02, which exceeds the value
obtained in our experiment.
IV. SUPPLEMENTARY METHODS
A. Experimental parameters
To analyze our bit commitment protocol in any prac-
tical experiment, several probabilities have to be deter-
mined. Supplementary Tables S1 summarizes all the
probabilities we will need to estimate. We emphasize
that all such probabilities are conditioned on the event
that Alice registers a round, i.e. sees a valid click.
A difficulty in estimating the probabilities of success in
a “round” arises from the fact that generation of photon
pairs in a parametric down conversion source is a stochas-
tic process. Furthermore, losses in the system may occur
in the source or in detectors, and we do not have an easy
way of assessing the losses reliably. We thus try to es-
timate bounds of the required probabilities for the bit
commitment protocol out of observable quantities both
Alice and Bob can agree upon. For this purpose, we
model losses and background events in our system in a
way shown in Supplementary Figures S1.
The rates (i.e., events per unit of time) observed at
Alice are then given by
rA = ηA(rs + rbA) , (S12)
where ηA indicates the detection efficiency and rbA a
background event rate; a similar expression holds for
Bob. The observed coincidence rate in this model is given
by
rp = ηAηBrs + racc . (S13)
where racc reflects the so-called accidental coincidence
rate, caused by detection events on both sides happening
within the coincidence time window τc that are not due
to valid clicks form the same photon pair. This rate can
be bounded from observed rates rA and rB to
racc < r
max
acc = rArBτc , (S14)
assuming that all detection events on both sides are
caused by uncorrelated events. In our experiment, this
quantity would result in a value of rmaxacc = 14.9±0.18s−1,
and is negligible compared to the observed coincidence
rate rs. This quantity was independently assessed by
recording the rate of detection time pairings tA, tB in a
time window that was displaced by τd = 20ns from the
“true” coincidences, i.e., |tA − tB − τd| ≤ τc [29]. We
found a rate of racc = 5.3 ± 3.3 s−1 over the course of
several bit commitment runs. Since racc ≪ rp, we from
now on neglect these events in the rate estimations, and
interpret their occurence just as events that increase the
error ratio.
To evaluate the probability p1sent that exactly one pho-
ton was sent to Bob in the interval τc around a time when
Alice has seen an event, we first consider the probability
p0sent that no photon was sent to Bob, given Alice has
seen an event. This can only be caused by a background
event with Alice. Thus, p0sent equals the probability that
a detection event on Alice’s side is caused by background,
which is given by
p0sent =
rbA
rbA + rs
= 1− rs
rbA + rs
= 1− ηArs
ηA(rbA + rs)
= 1− ηArs
rA
= 1− rp
ηBrA
(S15)
Since the efficiency ηB is not known exactly, we set it to
1 and thereby obtain an upper bound for p0sent:
p0sent < 1−
rp
rA
= 0.875± 0.009 (S16)
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Next, we consider the probability pn>1sent that more than
one photon has been sent to Bob, given that Alice has
seen an event. This probability is the product of the
probability that Alice’s event was caused by a photon
pair, and the probability that at least one other pho-
ton pair than the one causing the event on Alice’s side
was generated in the coincidence time window τc. From
equation S15, the first probability is given by rp/(ηBrA).
For the latter, we consider the statistics of photon pairs
emerging from a continuously pumped SPDC source.
While light emerging from a downconversion process is
known to follow thermal photon counting statistics, the
coherence time of the photons in our case (0.73 ps for an
optical bandwidth of 3 nm) is much shorter than τc. In
this case, the statistics of several photon pairs in time
window τc follows a Poisson distribution. Since the cre-
ation of an additional photon pair is then independent of
the first photon pair, and the probability that no photon
pair is created in τc is given by e
−rsτc , the probability
of creating at least one more photon pair is given by
1− e−rsτc . This brings us to
pn>1sent =
rp
ηBrA
(1− e−rsτc)
<
rp
ηBrA
rsτc =
rp
ηBrA
rp
ηAηB
τc
=
r2p
rAηAη2B
(S17)
The efficiencies ηA, ηB are not accessible directly from
the experiment, but can be bounded by ηA > rp/rB and
ηB > rp/rA via S12. With this, we can further bound
expression S17 and arrive at
pn>1sent <
rArB
rp
τc = 5.32± 0.17× 10−4 , (S18)
which is much smaller than the uncertainty on p0sent.
With this, we arrive at
p1sent = 1− p0sent − pn>1sent > 0.125± 0.009 (S19)
and
p1sent + p
0
sent = 1− pn>1sent > 0.99947± 0.000017 (S20)
Finally, the probability for an honest Bob not seeing an
event in a coincidence time window if Alice has detected
something is the complement to the probability that Bob
sees something if Alice has seen something. The latter,
by definition, is given by the ratio rp/rA. Thus, we have
phB,noclick = 1− rp/rA = 0.875± 0.009 . (S21)
B. Symmetrizing losses
In practice, not all detectors have the same efficiency.
Losses will be higher for some detectors than for others.
This will lead to imbalances in the choice of basis and
the choice of BB84 encoded qubit. In our protocol, such
imbalances affect the security in two places. First, if Alice
is honest, but Bob is trying to cheat, such imbalances
give him additional information about which bit or basis
was used. His advantage is similar to the advantage that
an eavesdropper in QKD would gain from knowing such
extra information. Second, if Bob is honest, but Alice
is trying to cheat, having higher losses in one basis does
reveal information to Alice in which basis Bob measured
- if Bob does not report a loss it is more likely that he
used the basis for which losses occur less often.
We describe a method to deal with such imbalances
securely - the same method can be used to address im-
balances on Alice’s and Bob’s side. For simplicity, we
outline the procedure in detail for Alice; exactly the same
method can be used to symmetrize Bob’s detectors. The
essential idea is to make all detectors equally inefficient,
by throwing away (i.e., declaring as lost) rounds where
detectors with higher efficiencies registered a click. Note
that in our protocol, Alice can discard additional rounds
without consequences for security parameters. Mean-
while, discarding additional rounds on Bob’s side in-
creases phB,noclick. Detection events combining with such
post-processing procedures, define the occurrence of a
valid round. In other words, if a single click occurred
on both sides and was not manually discarded for sym-
metrizing purposes, this event is considered a valid round.
In our setup, Alice has four detectors, one for each bit
in each basis. Let x, θ label the detector corresponding
to a bit x ∈ {0, 1} in basis θ ∈ {0, 1}. Let pθ denote the
probability that basis θ is chosen, and let px|θ denote the
probability that bit x occurs given basis θ. Finally, let
tx,θ denote the probability that Alice keeps bit x in basis
θ when the detector x, θ clicks. That is, Alice discards
bit x in basis θ with probability 1 − tx,θ even though
a click occurred. Our goal will be to determine the tx,θ
that renders Pr[x, θ|keep], the probability that x, θ occurs
conditioned on the event that Alice keeps a particular
detection event the same for all x and θ.
First of all, note that the probability that a particular
detection event is not discarded, i.e. Alice accepts it as
a round, can be written as
Pr[keep] =
∑
x,θ∈{0,1}
pθpx|θtx,θ . (S22)
By Bayes’ rule
Pr[x, θ|keep] = Pr[keep|x, θ] Pr[x, θ]
Pr[keep]
(S23)
=
tx,θpx|θpθ
Pr[keep]
. (S24)
Ideally, all probabilities are the same, i.e., for all x and θ
Pr[x, θ|keep] = 1
4
. (S25)
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This yields 4 equations, in 3 free parameters since∑
x,θ tx,θ = 1. These can easily be solved for tx,θ.
For our setup, the parameters for symmetrization on
Alice’ side are as follows:
t0,0 = 1
t0,1 = 0.963077
t1,0 = 0.882305
t1,1 = 0.871353. (S26)
Symmetrization on Bob’s side is dealt with in the same
manner. This however increases the value of phB,noclick,
since now an honest Bob deliberately throws away more
clicks. This leads to a new value of
p˜hB,noclick = 1− (1− phB,noclick) · Pr [keep] . (S27)
For our setup, the parameters for symmetrization on
Bob’s side are:
t0,0 = 0.679745
t0,1 = 1
t1,0 = 0.665591
t1,1 = 0.662890. (S28)
The probability of Bob keeping a click during sym-
metrization is Pr [keep] = 0.729646. This combining with
the initial estimate of phB,noclick gives p˜
h
B,noclick = 0.909,
implying a high amount of losses. Even so, the protocol
remains secure due to the fact that the source provides
multi-photons to Bob with an extremely small proba-
bility, whenever Alice observes only a single detection
event. In other words, p1sent+p
d
B,noclick is extremely high,
as stated in (S20). In such cases, even a high amount of
losses do not compromise security of the protocol.
Also, it should be stressed that perr should be evaluated
for the set of data after all symmetrization procedures,
since there can be bias in the error rates for each bit and
basis. For the set of symmetrized data, perr = 0.0412, in
comparison with before symmetrization, perr = 0.0428.
C. Theoretical security analysis
In the security proof, we divide the protocol into two
parts: the first part is Weak String Erasure with Errors
(WSEE), and the remaining procedure is Bit Commit-
ment (BC).
Theoretical parameters
Next to the experimental parameters defined in the
Supplementary Tables S1, our analysis will make fre-
quent use of the following parameter definitions. There
are two more basic parameters in this analysis: M and
ǫ.
The parameter ǫ represents a fixed error parameter,
i.e., we want to achieve security up to an error of O(ǫ).
This parameter is used to bound the occurrence proba-
bility of bad events, and we need to frequently refer to
it throughout the analysis. Such bounds are achieved by
making use of the Hoeffding inequality. It says that given
a random variableXj ∈ {0, 1}, where Pr(Xi = 0) = 1−p,
Pr(Xi = 1) = p, and Y = Σ
N
i=1Xi we have
Pr[Y ≤ (p−α)N ] = Pr[Y ≥ (p+α)N ] = e−2α2N . (S29)
The way we will use the Hoeffding inequality is that we
demand that e−2α
2N ≤ ǫ, and then solve for α such that
our demand is satisfied.
Meanwhile, M denotes the number of signals that Al-
ice counted as valid, i.e., she registers a round (but not
necessarily Bob as well).
Based on ǫ and M , we will need the following defini-
tions:
ζhB,noclick :=
√
ln 2ǫ
2M
n := (1− phB,noclick − ζhB,noclick)M
α1 :=
√
ln 1ǫ
2n
m :=
(
1
2
− α1
)
n
α2 :=
√
ln 2ǫ
2m
α3 :=
√
ln 1ǫ
d
(S30)
where d is the minimum distance of the error-correcting
code used in the protocol, and n is the number of valid
rounds that remain.
Weak string erasure
Definition
We first provide an informal definition of weak string
erasure with errors (WSEE). A formal definition can be
found in [17]. When both Alice and Bob are honest, an
(n, λ, ǫ, perr)-WSEE scheme provides Alice with a string
Xn and Bob with a randomly chosen subset I ∈ [n], as
well as a substring X˜I . This substring is thereby given
by the substring XI (the bits of Xn corresponding to the
indices in I) passed through a binary symmetric channel
that flips each bit of XI with probability perr.
To specify the security condition against dishonest
Bob, we first need to quantify the uncertainty of Bob
about Xn, given access to the entire system of a dishon-
est Bob denoted as B′. This is done by lower bounding
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the min-entropy of Xn conditioned on Bob’s information,
Hmin(X
n|B′)ρXnB′ := − logPguess(Xn|B′)
Pguess(X
n|B′) := max
{Dx}x
∑
x
PX(x) tr(Dxρx),(S31)
where Pguess is referred to as the guessing probability,
namely the probability that Bob correctly guesses Xn,
maximized over all measurement strategies upon his sys-
tem B′ [40]. The ǫ-smooth min-entropy is defined as
Hǫmin(X
n|B′)ρXnB′ := sup
ρ′
Hmin(X
n|B′)ρ′ (S32)
maximized over all states ρ′ such that the purified
distance C(ρ′, ρXnB′) =
√
1− F 2(ρ′, ρXnB′) ≤ ǫ, where
F (ρ, τ) denotes the fidelity of states ρ and τ . Intuitively,
this quantity behaves like the min-entropy, except with
a probabilistic error ǫ.
We can now state the security conditions for an
(n, λ, ǫ, perr)-WSEE:
1. Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then the
amount of information a dishonest Bob holds aboutXn is
limited, i.e. the ǫ-smooth min entropy of Xn conditioned
on a dishonest Bob’s information is lower bounded
1
n
Hǫmin(X
n|B′) ≥ λ, (S33)
where λ is referred to as the smooth min-entropy rate.
2. Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then Alice does
not have any information I. That is, Alice does not learn
which bits of Xn are known to Bob.
Protocol
In principle, WSEE can be achieved experimentally by
using any QKD device. However, we emphasize that the
experimental requirements and analysis differs entirely.
In particular, security of QKD for a particular setup does
not imply security of bit commitment.
Recall from the informal statement of the protocol in
the main part of our paper that if Alice herself concludes
that no photon or a multi-photon has been emitted in a
particular time slot, she simply discards this event and
tells Bob to discard it as well. Since this action repre-
sents no security problem for us, we will for simplicity
omit these events all-together when stating the more de-
tailed protocol below. This means thatM in the protocol
below, actually refers to the set of post-selected pulses
that Alice did register as a round. In practice, Alice re-
ports the missing events to Bob after the waiting time
has passed. In principle, this could be used to obtain
better security bounds as Bob does not yet know which
bits are indeed relevant when he uses his storage device.
However, we leave such a refined analysis for future work.
In addition, introducing time slots enables Bob to re-
port a particular bit as missing, if he obtained no click in
a particular time slot. Alice and Bob will subsequently
discard all lost rounds. In the protocol below, we assume
the detectors have already been symmetrized appropri-
ately as outlined in the Supplementary Methods IVB.
The purpose of symmetrizing is to ensure that losses are
independent of basis choice, hence Alice cannot obtain
any information about I by observing the rounds re-
ported lost by Bob.
Protocol 1: Weak String Erasure with Errors
(WSEE)
Outputs: xn ∈ {0, 1}n to Alice, (I, z|I|) ∈ 2[n] ×
{0, 1}|I| to Bob.
1. Alice: Chooses a string xM ∈R {0, 1}M and
basis-specifying string θM ∈R {0, 1}M uniformly
at random.
2. Bob: Chooses a basis string θ˜M ∈R {0, 1}M
uniformly at random.
3. In time slot i = 1, . . . ,M :
1. Alice: Encodes bit xi in the basis θi (i.e.,
as Hθi |xi〉), and sends the resulting state
to Bob.
2. Bob: Measures in the basis given by θ˜i to
obtain outcome x˜i. If Bob obtains no click
in this time slot, he records round i as lost.
4. Bob: Reports missing rounds to Alice.
5. Alice: If the number of rounds that
Bob reported missing does not lie in the
interval [(phB,noclick − ζhB,noclick)M, (phB,noclick +
ζhB,noclick)M ], then Alice aborts the protocol.
Otherwise, she deletes all bits from xM that Bob
reported missing. Let xn ∈ {0, 1}n denote the
remaining bit string, and let θn be the basis-
specifying string for the remaining rounds. Let
θ˜n, and x˜n be the corresponding strings for Bob.
Both parties wait time ∆t.
6. Alice: Sends the basis information θn to Bob,
and outputs xn.
7. Bob: Computes I := {i ∈ [m] | θi = θ˜i}, and
outputs (I, z|I|) := (I, x˜I).
How large is n going to be? Since Alice aborts if Bob
reports too many rounds as missing, we have that n ≥
(1 − phB,noclick − ζhB,noclick)M . If a fixed n is desired, we
can take n = (1 − phB,noclick − ζhB,noclick)M as in (S30),
where Alice randomly truncates the resulting string, and
informs Bob about the truncation. This is the approach
we take here. In our protocol, there is also a possibility
that Alice aborts. An abort here means that Alice simply
generates a random xn as output. This means that our
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protocol does at all times generate a string of length n =
(1− phB,noclick − ζhB,noclick)M .
Analysis
The analysis of weak sting erasure with errors has al-
ready been performed in [25]. Essentially, losses allow
a dishonest Bob to discard a fraction of single-photon
detection events, and keep more multi-photon events so
that his chance of guessingXn correctly is increased. The
resulting min-entropy rate λ can thereby be calculated as
a function of experimental parameters listed in Supple-
mentary Tables S1. That is, the min-entropy rate is a
function of p1sent, p
h
B,noclick, p
d
B,noclick, and M
λ = λ(p1sent, p
h
B,noclick, p
d
B,noclick,M) . (S34)
In our further analysis, we will hence assume that WSEE
has been shown secure, and state security as a function
of a fixed parameter λ and fixed n. We then combine the
two to give explicit security paramters as a function of
the experimental parameters.
Bit commitment from weak string erasure
What remains is to analyse security of the bit commit-
ment protocol(BC) based on WSEE. An informal defini-
tion of BC was stated in the introduction, and a formal
one can be found in [17]. The protocol below is very sim-
ilar to the one proposed in [17], which gave a BC protocol
for weak string erasure without errors (i.e., perr = 0). To
address the case of perr > 0, we introduce modifications
to the BC protocol, allowing the modified protocol to
stay secure up to a certain amount of bit flip error from
the experimental setup.
Protocol
We present the fully modified BC protocol as Protocol
2, by including WSEE as a sub-protocol. Our protocol
allows Alice to commit a stringDl ∈ {0, 1}l to Bob. How-
ever, for our experiment we chose to commit only a single
bit l = 1 which is the scenario typically considered in bit
commitment. Our protocol makes use of the parameters
defined in (S30).
Protocol 2: Non-Randomized Bit Commit-
ment(BC)
By using an binary linear error-correcting code C, let
Syn:{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−k be the function that outputs
the parity check syndrome for C. Also, select Ext:
{0, 1}n × R → {0, 1}l from a set of 2-universal hash
functions.
(A) Commit Phase
1. Alice and Bob : execute (n, λ, ǫ, perr)WSEE.
Alice obtains Xn while Bob obtains X˜I and I.
2. Bob : Checks if |I| ≥ m. If so, he randomly
truncates I until |I| = m. Otherwise, he aborts
the protocol.
2. Alice:
a) computes w=Syn(Xn) and sends it to Bob.
b) picks a 2-universal hash function r ∈R R and
sends it to Bob.
3. Alice: Commits Cl ∈ {0, 1}l by computing
Dl = Ext(Xn, r) and sends El = Cl ⊕ Dl to
Bob.
(B) Open Phase
1. Alice: reveals the complete string Xn to Bob.
2. Bob: Perform checks:
a) computing the syndrome and check that it
agrees with w sent by Alice.
b) checking Xn against X˜I , ensuring that the
number of bits that disagree at positions in I lie
in the interval [(perr − α2)m, (perr + α2)m].
3. Bob: If conditions are satisfied, he accepts com-
mitment and calculates Dl = Ext(Xn, r). Both
of them output Cl.
The are two modifications in this protocol compared
to its previous version in [17]. The first is the use of a
different error-correcting code C. We will first provide a
general analysis to prove the security of bit commitment,
given that several conditions on both the rate and relative
minimum distance of the error-correcting code used are
met. We then show that by generating a binary linear
code at random, the conditions on minimum distance and
rate can be satisfied, except for a small probabilistic error
that can be later added upon the total security error of
the protocol.
Note that random codes do not pose a problem when
executing the protocol since honest parties never need to
decode. Details of the properties of error-correcting codes
can be found in the Supplementary Discussion. Secondly,
the checks performed by Bob in the open phase have been
modified to account for the existence of bit flip errors,
such that Bob tolerates a certain limited amount of er-
rors.
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Analysis
Intuitively, bit flip errors in WSEE give Alice more
freedom to cheat, as a malicious Alice can avoid the
errors and choose to corrupt the string Xn herself. In
other words, the actual bit flip error perr in such a
scenario equals zero. This makes it harder for Bob to
identify a cheating Alice. This is because whenever
he finds a discrepancy between XI and Xn, he cannot
be sure if it was due to a bit flip error or a malicious Alice.
We now proceed to prove that the protocol is secure,
except for a minimal probability ǫ when perr is sufficiently
small. The proof is done in three steps as shown:
1. Correctness: If both parties are honest, Bob always
accepts the commitment except with minimal prob-
ability.
2. Security against Alice: For any dishonest Alice, Bob
detects her attempt to cheat and rejects the com-
mitment except with minimal probability.
3. Security against Bob: For any dishonest Bob, he does
not obtain information about the committed bit
except with minimal probability.
a. Correctness We shall first prove the correctness
of the protocol, namely under the situation that Alice and
Bob are both honest, Bob always accepts the protocol
except with some minimal probability ǫ.
Lemma 1 (Correctness of the protocol). If Alice and
Bob are both honest, then the protocol is 2ǫ-correct.
Proof. There are two steps in this proof. Firstly, we
show that Bob receives at least m bits from WSEE
except with probability ǫ. Secondly, we prove that the
number of erroneous bits Bob picks up is close to the
expected value perrm, except for probability ǫ. The total
probability of error for either events occurring is then 2ǫ
since failure occurs in either case.
Since each bit Xi from Alice is obtained by Bob with
probability 12 , by applying the Hoeffding’s inequality to
the random variable Y = |I|, i.e. the length of substring
Bob obtains from WSEE, we see that
Pr[Y ≤ (1
2
− α1)n] ≤ e−2α21n ≤ ǫ, (S35)
where n is the length of string Xn Alice has. Using
α1 defined in (S30) allows Bob to get at least m bits
except for probability ǫ. Note that the probability 1/2
is determined by Bob’s random choice of basis, and is
independent of perr.
We then proceed to show that the number of erroneous
bits Bob expects to obtain lie within the interval [(perr−
α2)m, (perr + α2)m] except for some probability ǫ. Note
that since previously we have shown that Bob obtains
at least m bits, we can safely fix the length of Bob’s
substring to be m.
Again by applying the Hoeffding’s inequality, with the
random variable of interest Z to be the number of erro-
neous bits Bob obtains,
Pr[|Z − perrm| ≥ α2m] ≤ 2e−2α22m ≤ ǫ (S36)
again by using α2 as defined in (S30). Hence the correct-
ness of the protocol is guaranteed except for probability
2ǫ.
b. Security against dishonest Alice We now proceed
to prove security against Alice. Recall that a malicious
Alice can avoid bit flip errors and tamper with the
bit string directly. We need to show that no matter
how Alice tampers with the string, Bob will detect her
cheating with probability close to unity.
Previously [17] for perr = 0 , whenever Bob checks XI
against Xn and finds one faulty bit, he aborts the proto-
col directly. However, in a realistic setup Bob accepts a
number of roughly perrm bits. By properties of the error-
correcting code, we know from [17] that for any attack
of Alice she has to change at least d2 such that the Bob
will accept the syndrome to be consistent [17]. With this,
we set a constraint on the code distance used such that
whenever Alice attempts to cheat, Bob picks up enough
faulty bits to detect the cheating except for some minimal
probability.
Lemma 2 (Security against Alice). If Bob is honest,
given that Alice and Bob use an error-correcting code
with minimum distance d >
2(perr+α2)(
1
2
−α1)n
1
2
−α3 , the pair
of protocols(Commit, Open) is 2ǫ-binding.
Proof. In our proof we assume that a malicious Alice can
avoid all bit flip errors in WSEE, so that the scenario
reduces to WSE where perr = 0. From the proof of
correctness, we know that Bob obtains enough bits from
WSEE except with probability ǫ.
For any general attack Alice can attempt, to satisfy
Bob’s check on the syndrome she has to change at least
d
2 bits in the original string Xn, where d is the code dis-
tance [17]. Since Bob picks up each faulty bit with prob-
ability 12 , by defining W to be the number of faulty bits
where Bob obtains in his substring, and applying Hoeffd-
ing’s inequality,
Pr
[
W ≤ (1
2
− α3)d
2
]
≤ e−α23d = ǫ. (S37)
We see that Bob picks up at least (12 − α3)d2 flipped
bits except with probability ǫ, for α3 as defined in
(S30). Combining with the fact that Bob accepts at most
(perr + α2)m bits, we require
(
1
2
− α3)d
2
> (perr + α2)m. (S38)
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The requirement for code distance is then given by
d >
2(perr + α2)(
1
2 − α1)n
1
2 − α3
. (S39)
Hence generally when Alice and Bob use a code with
minimum distance that satisfies the above requirement,
whenever Alice attempts to cheat, the pair of protocols
is proven to be 2ǫ-binding.
c. Security against dishonest Bob Subsequently, we
prove security against Bob. Recall that a cheating Bob
can first make arbitrary measurements and store some
classical information, and then keep some quantum in-
formation in this noisy-storage device. The overall state
of Bob’s system can then be described as a ccq-state
ρXnKΘF(Q), where K being Bob’s classical information
obtained from measurements, Θ being Alice’s basis in-
formation, and F(Q) being Bob’s quantum information
stored in an imperfect quantum memory.
To quantify the ǫ-smooth min-entropy of Bob’s infor-
mation about Alice’s stringXn, we proceed as in [17]: We
first bound Bob’s ignorance about Xn based on his clas-
sical information K alone. Second, we then relate this
bound to his ignorance about Xn given K and F(Q).
This yields security statements in terms of the classical
capacity of F . Note that it is known that for very many
channels better security bounds are possible in terms
of the entanglement cost [22] and the quantum capac-
ity [23]. However, the classical capacity is still much bet-
ter understood and offers explicit parameters for many
interesting channels. In contrast, e.g. the quantum ca-
pacity of the depolarizing channel is not known.
To bound Bob’s ignorance given K alone, we invoke
our results of [41] as stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 3 (Uncertainty relation [41]). If Alice is hon-
est, the ǫ-smooth min-entropy of Bob’s information about
Xn is
Hǫmin(X
n|ΘnK) ≥ g(s)n+ 2 log ǫ− 1
s
, (S40)
where
g(s) =
−1
s
[log(1 + 2s)− (1 + s)] (S41)
for any 0 < s ≤ 1.
Theorem 3 gives us a bound on the min-entropy rate
of Bob’s classical information of Xn, whenever Alice is
honest. We then use Lemma 2.2 from [17] to bound
the min-entropy rate of Xn when he has the ccq-state
ρXnKΘF(Q).
Lemma 4 (Min-entropy with quantum side informa-
tion, [17]). Consider an arbitrary ccq-state ρXTQ, and
let ǫ, ǫ′ ≥ 0 be arbitrary. Let F : B(HQ) → B(HQ) be
an arbitrary CPTPM representing a quantum channel.
Then
Hǫ+ǫ
′
min (X
n|TF(Q)) ≥ − logPFsucc
(
⌊Hǫmin(Xn|T )− log
1
ǫ′
⌋
)
,
(S42)
with
PFsucc(Rn) := max{ρy}y,{Dy}y
1
2nR
∑
y∈{0,1}nR
tr(DyF(ρy)) ,
(S43)
where the maximum is taken over all encodings {ρy} and
decoding POVMs {Dy}y of classical symbols y.
Note that this bound is dependent on the properties
of the quantum storage device F . For example, if the
memory were to be of arbitrarily large size and noise-
less, the success probability PFsucc(Rn) is always 1, and
the min-entropy of Bob’s information about Xn would
be simply zero. However, the assumption of noisy and
bounded storage comes in here to give a sufficiently high
min-entropy which is crucial for the security proof. For
simplicity in further proofs, we also introduce a simpler
version, considering only bounded storage, which is a
simple consequence of the chain rule and monotonicity
of the min-entropy [12, 27].
Corollary 5 (Min-entropy for bounded quantum stor-
age). Assuming the min-entropy of Bob’s information of
Xn be Hǫ∞(X
n|T ), and Bob has a perfect quantum mem-
ory Q that can store S qubits.
Hǫmin(X
n|TQ) ≥ Hǫmin(Xn|T )− S. (S44)
With the above Theorem 3 and Lemma 4, we can prove
security against Bob in two steps. First, we show that if
Alice is honest, the min-entropy rate of Bob’s information
about the string Xn is lower bounded by λn for some
λ. Then, by using privacy amplification, we show that
the cq-state of C l and Bob’s information is 2ǫ-close to a
product state, with C l having uniform distribution over
{0, 1}l . As we are only interested in commiting a single
bit in this experiment, we will restrict our statement to
the case of l = 1. A more general statement can be
derived analogously.
Lemma 6 (Security against Bob). For a fixed parameter
ǫ, define λ to be the ǫ2 -smooth min-entropy rate of Bob’s
information about Xn. If Alice is honest, and if the code
rate satisfies
R ≥ 1− λ+ 2 log
1
ǫ
n
, (S45)
then the pair of protocols (Commit, Open) are 2ǫ-hiding
for l = 1, i.e. the commitment of a single bit.
Proof. After executing WSEE, by using Theorem 3 and
Theorem 5, Bob’s ǫ2 -smooth min-entropy about X
n can
be evaluated. Note that by sending the syndrome he
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obtains additional information about Xn, and this is ac-
counted for by the chain rule and monotonicity property
of min-entropy [27],
Hǫomin(X
n|B′, Syn(Xn)) ≥ Hǫomin(Xn|B′)− L. (S46)
where L is the length of the syndrome. Recall that the
length of syndrome is L = n−k = (1−R)n, where R = kn
is the code rate. Hence, we have
H
ǫ/2
min(X
n|B′, Syn(Xn)) ≥ (λ− 1 +R)n (S47)
which denotes the min-entropy rate of Bob’s total
information about Xn at the end of the commit phase.
Next, we show that by privacy amplification Bob does
not gain knowledge about the committed information C l .
Denoting the committed string as C l = Ext(Xn, R) ∈
{0, 1}l having length l we have from [27] that
ρC l ,B′Syn(Xn) ≈ǫ′ τ{0,1}l ⊗ ρB′,Syn(Xn) (S48)
where
ǫ′ = 2ǫo + 2−
1
2
[Hǫo
min
(Xn|B′,Syn(Xn))−l]−1 (S49)
and τA is the uniform distribution over the entire set A.
Setting ǫo =
ǫ
2 ,
ǫ′ = ǫ +
1
2
· 2− 12 [Hǫomin(Xn|B′,Syn(Xn))−l] (S50)
Setting the second term in (S50) to be ǫ, and setting
l = 1, this implies
λ− 1 +R − 1
n
> −2 log ǫ+ 2
n
, (S51)
Rearranging gives (S45). In the large n limit, we re-
quire R > 1− λ.
With this, we end the security proof against Bob.
In summary, we have derived conditions on the relative
minimum distance δ = dn and the code rate R for where
the protocol is secure. By combining Lemma 1, Lemma
2 and Lemma 6, we summarize these results into the
following theorem:
Theorem 7 (Conditions for successful execution of the
BC protocol). Let n ∈ N, ǫ > 0 and λ > 0. If the error
correcting code used satisfies the following requirements:
Relative minimum distance: δ >
2(perr+α2)(
1
2
−α1)
1
2
−α3 .
Code rate: R > 1− λ+ 2 log 1ǫn ,
then Protocol 2 is 2ǫ-correct, 2ǫ-binding and 2ǫ-hiding.
The final part of the theoretical analysis is to discuss
the feasibility of finding an error-correcting code that
satisfies the requirements stated in Theorem 7. Clearly,
there exists a trade-off between parameters of code rate
R and relative minimum distance δ. We make use of
Theorem 1 to argue that once the parity check matrix of
a code with rate R is randomly generated, its distance
is lower bounded except for an extremely small proba-
bility. Subsequently, by using Theorem 7 and Theorem
1, we evaluate an optimal parameter n = 2.5 × 105 in
the Supplementary Methods IVD, which is used in our
experiment, and show that for such a block length, the
bit commitment protocol is secure except for an error
3 · 10−4.
Also, by combining Theorem 7 with Theorem 1, we
provide a cleaner expression for the bound on minimum
distance accompanied by a lower bound on the block
length such that security can be achieved:
Theorem 8 (Secure bit commitment). Let ǫ > 0, λ ≥
0.3, β ∈ (0, 0.01], δ ∈ [0.05, 0.11], and
n ≥ 1
β2
log
2
ǫ
. (S52)
Also, denote h(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) as the
binary entropy function.
If the bit flip error rate satisfies
perr < (1− 4
√
5β) · δ
2
− β√
1− 2β , (S53)
and the smooth min-entropy rate satisfies
λ > h(δ) + 3β2, (S54)
then the bit commitment protocol is 3ǫ-secure by using a
randomly generated error-correcting code.
Proof. Fix ǫ and assume that√
ln 2ǫ
n
≤
√
log 2ǫ
n
≤ β. (S55)
This is achieved for any β, provided (S52) is true. Hence
from (S30), we have
0 ≤ α1 ≤ β. (S56)
Plugging this into m = (12 − α1)n gives
α2 =
√
ln 2ǫ
2m
≤ β√
1− 2β . (S57)
Meanwhile, assume that δ ≥ 0.05. This leads to the
condition that λ ≥ 0.3 which is generally achieved.
α3 ≤
√
20β. (S58)
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Plugging (S56), (S57), and (S58) into the condition on
minimum distance given in Theorem 7, we obtain
δ > 2 ·
perr +
β√
1−2β
1− 4√5β ≥
2(perr + α2)(
1
2 − α1)
1
2 − α3
. (S59)
Rearranging, we obtain (S53).
To derive (S54), we first use Theorem 1. By setting the
additional error from the generation of random codes to
be smaller than ǫ, we obtain
R < 1− h(δ)− log
1
ǫ
n
. (S60)
Combining this with the condition on code rate R given
in Theorem 7, we have
1− h(δ) > 1− λ+ 2log
1
ǫ
n
λ > h(δ) + 3
log 1ǫ
n
, (S61)
which is satisfied if (S54) is true. The total execution
error of Protocol 2 becomes 3ǫ, where 2ǫ comes from
the execution error in Theorem 7, and additional ǫ ac-
counts for the probability that a randomly generated
error-correcting code does not fulfill the requirement on
relative minimum distance δ.
(S52) provides us with a lower bound on n for a secure
implementation. Note that this lower bound is non-tight,
due to the approximations made while deriving bounds
for (S56), (S57), and (S58). Also, it is stressed that The-
orem 1 gives a general proof for a randomly generated
error-correcting code. This approach is taken because
systematic ways of constructing such binary linear codes
are not known, and the task of evaluating the minimum
distance of a given code is NP-hard. However, as out-
lined in the Supplementary Discussion III it is well known
that the probability of generating a code with undesir-
able properties is minimal and added as a source of error
in the protocol. It is also worth noting that a random
code allows for easy execution of the protocol, since the
only computation involved for honest parties is the cal-
culation of the syndrome. That is, Alice and Bob never
need to decode.
D. Range of experimental parameters for
implementation
In this section, we provide full statements about the
security of commitments, by combining the analysis ac-
counting for both erasures (WSEE) and errors (BC). We
work towards a simplified expression for the rate of com-
mitment, i.e. to commit one bit securely, what is the
required number of signals to send. We present region
plots showing where security holds for the protocol.
For security, we first note that the analysis of bit flip
errors requires a minimum guaranteed amount of min-
entropy λˆ for the commitment to be secure. This is seen
in Lemma 6 where the lower bound for code rate R can be
translated into a lower bound for the min-entropy rate.
The main condition for feasibility of bit commitment is
then given by
λ ≥ λˆ. (S62)
The following theorem shows λˆ by considering a ran-
domly generated binary linear code.
Theorem 9. By fixing an error parameter ǫ which indi-
cates the error for the generation of a random code. If
and given the parameter δ, which is the relative mini-
mum distance of the code required, as determined by perr
by using (S59),
λˆ = h(δ) +
3 log 1ǫ
n
. (S63)
On the other hand, we need to evaluate a bound on the
min-entropy rate λ created according to the parameters
p1sent, p
h
B,noclick and p
d
B,noclick. We begin by defining two
relevant fractional quantities:
m1left = p
1
sent − phB,noclick + pdB,noclick − 3ζ (S64)
mfrac = 1− phB,noclick − ζ (S65)
where ζ =
√
ln 2
ǫ
2M . The smooth min-entropy rate can
then be evaluated, by invoking the bounded, or in general
noisy storage assumption. We refer to below for some
examples.
Example: bounded storage
We state a theorem describing the number of signals
M needed to send for a secure commitment, given the
relevant experimental parameters and assuming the case
of bounded storage. It is worth stressing again that n
denotes the block length used in the commitment,
while M denotes the number of signals sent from
Alice to Bob. These quantities are related by the ex-
pressions given in (S30).
Lemma 10. Let a dishonest Bob’s storage size be
bounded by S. For fixed parameters S and ǫ, and given
the experimental probabilities listed in Table I, and for
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some β, γ ∈ (0, 0.01], let
m2 = p
1
sent − phB,noclick + pdB,noclick − 3γ
m3 = 1− phB,noclick
L′ = max
s∈(0,1]
−1
s
[log(1 + 2s)− 1− s]− 3ǫ
s
λˆ = h(δ) + 3β2
δ = 2 ·
perr +
β√
1−2β
1− 4√5β
M1 =
1
2γ2
log
2
ǫ
M2 =
log 1ǫ
ǫ ·m2
M3 =
log 2ǫ
(m3 − γ)β2
M4 =
S
m2L′ −m3λˆ
(S66)
For security to hold at all, the following is required:
m2L
′ −m3λˆ > 0. (S67)
If (S67) is true, then bit commitment can be im-
plemented 3ǫ-securely by using a randomly constructed
error-correcting code, whenever
M > max {M1,M2,M3,M4}. (S68)
Proof. By the analysis of [25], the min-entropy rate has
the form
λ =
m1left · L− SM
mfrac
, (S69)
where
L = max
s∈(0,1]
−1
s
[log(1 + 2s)− 1− s]− 3 log
1
ǫ
m1left ·M
. (S70)
Note that ζ is dependent on M , and its value decreases
while M increases. Setting ζ ≤ γ which is a constant,
provides an lower bound forM , which gives the value for
M1 depending on the chosen γ.
Similarly, setting
log 2
ǫ
m1
left
·M ≤ ǫ provides M2 and L ≥ L′.
M3 comes from the condition given for n at (S52), while
M = nmfrac ≥ nm3−γ . Lastly,
λ ≥ m2 · L
′ − SM
m3
≥ λˆ (S71)
provides the main condition for security to hold at all
(S=0), while rearranging gives the value for M4.
Example: noisy storage
Lemma 10 gives the case for bounded storage model,
with no quantum noise assumed for cheating Bob’s stor-
age device. For a more general noisy storage assumption,
where the quantum channel satisfies a strong converse re-
lation as in [17], the ǫ2 -smooth min-entropy can be eval-
uated by
Hǫ
′+ǫ′′
min (X
n|ΘnKF(Q))
≥ − logPN⊗Ssucc
[
Hǫ
′
min(X
n|ΘnK)− log 1
ǫ′′
]
= S · γN
(
Hǫ
′
min(X
n|ΘnK)− log 1ǫ′′
S
)
, (S72)
where γN is the strong converse parameter of the quan-
tum channel. For a fixed error parameter ǫ, ǫ′ and ǫ′′
should be chosen such that ǫ′+ ǫ′′ = ǫ2 . Compared to the
analysis in [25], where the storage size is determined by
introducing a storage rate quantity ν, in this analysis we
work with the quantity S, which is the maximum number
of qubits Bob is able to store. To use this quantity in the
analysis, we invoke the bounded storage assumption that
Bob cannot store more than S qubits, then calculate the
conditions for security. For example, in the setting of de-
polarizing noise for a two-dimensional quantum channel,
the strong converse parameter is given by the following
expression [17]:
γN (Rˆ) = max
α≥1
α− 1
α
(Rˆ− C)
C = 1− 1
1− α log [p
α + (1− p)α]
p =
1 + r
2
. (S73)
Our experiment
We state again the bounds of experimental parameters
as derived:
p1sent = 1− p0sent − pn>1sent > 0.125
p0sent + p
1
sent = 1− pn>1sent > 0.99947
phB,noclick = 0.909,
perr = 0.0412. (S74)
Note that phB,noclick and perr are values obtained after
the symmetrization procedures on both Alice’s and Bob’s
side.
Bounds on n (andM) derived based on Theorem 8 and
Lemma 10 are non-tight. Here, we use an optimal block
length such that the classical information post-processing
is minimal. We summarize the calculations in the follow-
ing steps:
1: Fix ǫ and n: Firstly, we set ǫ = 0.99× 10−5, and
n = 2.5× 105. By doing so, all relevant parameters
in (S30) can be evaluated, except for α3 which will
depend on the error-correcting code. M is known
by its relation with n as stated in (S30), where this
is justified by a detailed explanation offered right
after Protocol 1.
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2: Evaluate relative minimum distance δ: By
performing a numerical optimization that satisfies
the condition on relative distance, as stated in The-
orem 7, we obtain δ > 0.998201.
3: Set ǫcode: To obtain a code that with δ that satis-
fies the condition as evaluated in step 2, we use
Theorem 1. First, we need to set an ǫcode =
2 × 10−7, which bounds the probabilistic error for
generating a bad random code. By doing so, we
pose an upper bound upon the code rate R. Using
R = 0.531 satisfies this condition. By using The-
orem 7, the protocol is secure provided that the
ǫ
2 -smooth min entropy rate λ > 0.469133.
4: Evaluate storage assumption: By using
phB,noclick, p
h
B,noclick, p
1
sent, M and ǫ, evaluate and
optimize λ for different storage noise and storage
sizes S, such that λ satisfies the condition in Step
3.
5: Evaluate total execution error: The total exe-
cution error is then evaluated as ǫtotal = 2ǫ+ǫcode =
2× 10−5.
For the bounded storage assumption, the commit-
ment is secure whenever dishonest Bob’s storage size is
bounded by Sbounded = 928 qubits. For the noisy stor-
age assumption, we can use (S72) and maximize over all
choices of ǫ′ and ǫ′′. For a depolarizing noise of noise
parameter r = 0.9, the commitment is secure whenever
Bob’s storage size is bounded by Snoisy = 972 qubits.
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